Sunday, 30 September 2007

Myth, History And Politics

Ever since Ayodhya became a disputed territory, Rama has been at the centre stage of the political mobilisation by Hindu communal forces. The incidents associated with the Rama Katha were invoked one after the other to appeal to the religious sentiments of Hindus. It began with a claim to the birthplace of Rama at Ayodhya, around which Hindu religious sentiments were so aroused as to lead to the destruction of the Babri Masjid. In the movement culminating in this vandalism, several symbols linked with Rama such as Rama Jyoti, Rama Paduka and Rama Shila were floated.

Yet, over the years, the political appeal of Rama has waned despite his strong presence in the religious life of believers. The temple issue was indeed kept alive through occasional religious assemblies and demonstrations. Nevertheless, Rama ceased to be of much emotional value that would provide political advantage to Hindu communal forces. In the elections of 2004, the Ram temple did not figure as an issue at all. This can be taken as an indication that believers were inclined to abandon the Sangh Parivar’s aggressive Rama and return to worshipping his benign image, looking upon Rama Katha, as they had for centuries, as an “allegory of the life of the spirit as it journeyed through the world”.

Rama was almost lost to the political Hindu and was being resurrected to his rightful place in the religious life of believers. It is in this context that the Ram Sethu project has come in handy for the Sangh Parivar, to revive the appeal of Rama in order to breathe some life into its sagging fortunes. Once again the Parivar is bracing up to claim Rama for the communal cause. In the process it is attempting to turn myth into history, blurring the distinction between the two, in order to gain legitimacy for its political project.

The question of whether the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) should have filed an affidavit in the Supreme Court denying the historical existence of Rama has led to differences of opinion. The government has hastened to disclaim the affidavit and withdraw it, obviously fearing a Hindu backlash. Unlike the Ayodhya issue, even the secular voice has been rather muted. However, implicit in the affidavit is an important question regarding our approach to the past: Is there a distinction between myth and history?

Mythic Character

The ASI, it appeared, was conscious of this distinction in projecting the mythological character of Rama. The distinction does not imply a counterposition of myth and history as false and true. Myth is a way in which the human mind comes to grips with reality, and therefore, it can be said that it refers to reality. Yet, myth in itself is not reality. What the ASI has tried to state is that Rama was not a historical figure but a mythic character.

Similarly, the Ramayana being a literary piece, which was not originally a religious text but only sacralised later, contains many events and incidents that are products of imagination. It would therefore be futile to try to correlate them with historical fact and establish their authenticity. Such a view is not in any way a denigration of Rama or a critical reflection on the Ramayana. The Ramayana’s literary quality, whether in the original Sanskrit or in regional languages, is well known. So are the ethical and moral values it foregrounds, which exercise considerable influence over the life of believers.

However, devotion to Rama and the influence of the epic have nothing to do with the historical veracity of Rama Katha. Devotees consider Rama an incarnation and do not test his deeds by the yardstick of historical truth. They are moved by their devotion and hardly approach the epic from a rational viewpoint or try to locate it historically. Whether the Ramayana is historically true or not is not a factor in their devotion. The Sangh Parivar has been trying for long to impute to incidents in the epic a historical quality to legitimise popular belief, under a false notion that belief would be reinforced by historical truth.

The panic reaction of the government in withdrawing the affidavit in effect endorses the Sangh Parivar’s attempt to equate myth with history. Like the Sangh Parivar, the government seems to subscribe to the view that ascribing mythic character to Rama and the Ramayana is to undermine their importance and to injure the sentiments of believers. It overlooks the fact that believers consider Rama an incarnation. Traditional religious sources represent him so. The Matsya Purana, for instance, gives the following account: “There is also the account of the pastimes of Lord Rama, spoken by Valmiki – an account originally related by Brahma in one billion verses. That Ramayana was later summarised by Narada and related by Valmiki, who then presented it to mankind.” What accounts for the devotion to Rama and the veneration of the Ramayana are not their historical veracity but their divinity.

Many Ramayanas

In an attempt to attribute historical authenticity to the epic and its protagonist, the Sangh Parivar has been striving to privilege one single version of the Ramayana. But the Ramayana has several versions. It is difficult to ascertain the exact number as all of them are not written but are orally transmitted, both in India as well as in other Asian countries. A.K. Ramanujan has argued that these different “tellings” – a term he prefers to versions or variants as these imply an invariant or original text – differ from one another. They are not mere divergences from Valmiki’s rendering but entirely different tellings.

Highlighting the multivocal existence of Rama Katha, Paula Richman has drawn attention to the many Ramayanas, of which Valmiki’s composition is one, Tulsi’s another, Kamban’s another, the Buddhist Jataka yet another and the Jaina tradition yet another. Along with them, there are also innumerable folk narratives, extant not only in India but also in almost all the countries of Asia. They were not Valmiki’s Ramayana adapted to local conditions but substantially different from one another, both in form and content. In the Buddhist version, Rama and Sita are originally brother and sister, a fact that once aroused the ire of the Sangh Parivar.

Women’s folksongs from Andhra Pradesh challenge the accepted values of a male-dominated society by questioning the integrity of Rama and foregrounding the theme of the suffering that husbandly neglect causes a wife. Thus, the Rama Katha prevalent in different communities is vastly different and defies any attempt to identify a universally applicable text. All of them draw upon locally specific cultural traits, which impart to them a distinct character. Recent studies on different Rama Katha traditions demonstrate the different tellings of Rama’s story that vary with regional literary tradition, social location, gender, religious affiliation, colonial context, intended audience, and so on.

K.R. Srinivasa Iyengar’s edited work highlights the Asian variations of the Ramayana, and the essays in the volume edited by Avadesh Kumar Singh focus on the way the epic has found expression in regional languages. The many Ramayanas connote that the events and incidents in the different versions of the epic are not historical facts but mythical representations or literary imaginations. The debate on whether the Ramayana is a true story or whether Rama is a historical figure is, therefore, off the mark.

The issue of Ram Sethu requires to be situated in the general context of the mythological character of the Ramayana. The Sethu Bandhan encapsulates within it several qualities of Rama and the character of the epic. Sethu Bandhan was a humanly impossible task that was made possible only by the divine powers of Rama. The description of Sethu Bandhan in one version of the Ramayana is as follows: “During the first day of construction, monkeys laid a hundred and twenty miles of rocks, which floated upon the ocean. They worked very swiftly, and were happy to see the bridge take shape. The second day, they set down a hundred and sixty miles of rocks; the third day, a hundred and sixty-eight miles; and the fourth day, their strength increasing, they completed a hundred and seventy-six miles. On the fifth and final day, the monkeys constructed a hundred and eighty-four miles of bridge, up to Mount Suvala on the northern shore of Lanka. Thus when the bridge was finished, it was eighty miles wide and eight hundred miles long.”

Obviously, a vanar sena would not have achieved this feat. The question, however, is not its possibility or impossibility but how it enriches the mythical and divine quality of Rama. Obviously Sethu Bandhan is a myth.

But then, when myths become part of the belief system, they can be put to use for different purposes. Nobody in India has understood this better than the Sangh Parivar as is evident from the manner in which they have manipulated the myth and history of Ayodhya. Ram Sethu is an opportunity they are unlikely to let go of easily.

The distinction between history and myth is well recognised. Myths are in a way the opposite of historical facts, in the sense that, unlike historical facts, what constitutes a myth is not verifiable. Despite this, myths and history cannot be counterpoised as true and false.

In fact, myths also represent reality but represent it symbolically and metaphorically. Yet, myth masks reality. Therefore, myths are illusory representations of man and his world. Given their illusory nature, myths may not help to unravel the historicity of an event. Most myths are in a way timeless. Nevertheless, myths being a reflection of reality constitute a source of historical reconstruction and a means to understanding reality. Given this overlap, myths are used for a variety of purposes. They often serve as an agency of legitimisation, as in the case of Parasurama reclaiming land from the sea. They may also be employed for explaining a natural phenomenon, as in the case of Helios’ chariot in Greek mythology.

The use of myths has been integral to the politics of the Sangh Parivar. Beginning with the movement for the construction of the temple at Ayodhya, the Sangh Parivar has been engaged in providing authenticity to various myths surrounding the life of Rama. The central issue of the Ayodhya movement was the identification of the exact birthplace of Rama, which was difficult to ascertain owing to the lack of evidence. Local tradition identifies Ayodhya through a popular myth, which runs as follows: “After Treta Yuga when Ram was supposed to have been born Ayodhya could not be located. While Vikramaditya was looking for Ayodhya, a saint told him to leave a calf loose and the place at which the calf secreted milk would be the place where Ayodhya was located. Vikramaditya did as he was told, and where the calf secreted milk he located Ayodhya.” This mythical story became the basis for the identification of Ayodhya as well as the birthplace of Rama.

In the accounts given by leaders of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), the place of birth becomes an indisputable fact of history. Following this identification, the VHP accorded historical status to a series of myths. These include the existence of the Ram temple at the site of the Babri Masjid and the attempts by Hindus to reclaim the temple through 77 battles against the Muslims in which 300,000 sacrificed their lives. These myths have now become authentic histories; not only are they paraded as historical facts, they have found place in textbooks as authentic history. Over a period of time, many of these facts could become part of popular history also.

The politics of the Sangh Parivar is essentially irrational. The attempt to turn myth into history and to use it for political advantage is rooted in irrationality. Now that Ayodhya is no more a potent force, Ram Sethu has emerged as a possible alternative. The Sangh Parivar is gearing up to exploit it. Would the ruling establishment take a rational and scientific stand and not succumb to the fear of the irrational?


By K.N.Panikkar
(K.N. Panikkar, a former professor of history at Jawaharlal Nehru University and a former vice-chancellor of Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit, is currently the chairman of the Kerala Council for Historical Research.)
Copyright © 2007, Frontline

Burmese Troops Gun Down Protestors



Over the past two days, the Burmese military regime has brutally suppressed large anti-junta protests in the major cities of Rangoon and Mandalay, breaking up crowds with tear gas, batons, rubber bullets and live rounds. The state media reported that nine people died in clashes on Thursday, but reports from activists, diplomats and a handful of foreign journalists suggest the figure could be considerably higher.

The crackdown began on Wednesday night and early Thursday morning when troops raided monasteries, including the Shwedagon Pagoda and Sule Pagoda in Rangoon, arresting hundreds of Buddhist monks. Five key monasteries, which have been centres of opposition, were declared no-go areas and sealed off to prevent protestors from gathering.

In one incident, soldiers forced their way into the Ngwe Kyar monastery in South Okkalapa, a suburb of Rangoon, Wednesday night and arrested about 100 monks. Thousands of people gathered in nearby streets and began pelting the troops with stones. Eight people, including a high school student, died when soldiers opened fire with automatic weapons.

Up to 70,000 people defied a military ban and marched in Rangoon on Thursday. Protests reportedly took place in Mandalay and other centres, including Sittwe, Pakokku and Moulmein. In central Rangoon, near the Sule Pagoda, some 20 truckloads of troops and police set up roadblocks. As protestors threw stones and bottles, the security forces responded with shots and tear gas. Eyewitnesses said the military gave people 10 minutes to disperse and started firing.

Among the dead was a Japanese journalist, Kenji Nagai, 50, who was photographing the clashes. The state media claimed that a stray bullet had killed him, but amateur video shown on Japan’s Fuji television showed him being deliberately shot.

Reports of protests yesterday were scanty. The country’s main Internet connection had been cut, blocking the stream of photographs, video and reports that were reaching the outside world in previous days. The mobile phone network was also not functioning. While officials reported damage to an undersea cable, there is little doubt that the generals have ordered the censorship.
A correspondent for the London-based Times described smaller protests near the Sule Pagoda and clashes of young demonstrators with heavily-armed security forces. “It was a loose, ragged, frustrating day in Rangoon, a day of baton charges, beatings and many rumours of much worse. I saw soldiers levelling guns, firing volleys of hard rubber pellets, as well as chases and arrests,” he wrote.

Agence France Presse reported that up to 10,000 people were involved in protests yesterday in central Rangoon and repeatedly confronted troops and police. A separate group of around 500 marched through the streets and were applauded by onlookers. In Mandalay, thousands of young people on motorbikes rode down a major thoroughfare toward a blockade set up by security forces, but were driven back.

The police round up of opposition leaders, including members of the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi, is continuing. An NLD official told the media that two prominent leaders, Hla Pe and Myint Thei, were arrested in raids on their homes. Members of the 88 Generation Students Group, an organisation formed last year by veterans of the 1988 protests against the junta, have been detained.
International hypocrisy

Students, young monks and ordinary people are displaying great courage in confronting the junta and its troops, and demanding basic democratic rights and better living standards. However, the limited character of the opposition’s political perspective is underscored by its appeals to the UN and major powers to intervene.

The condemnations of the junta by US President George Bush, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and other leaders reek of hypocrisy. The Bush administration and its allies are no more concerned about democratic rights in Burma than in Iraq, where the US military is every bit as ruthless as its Burmese counterparts in suppressing popular opposition to its continued occupation.

Washington’s objection to the Burmese junta is not its suppression of democratic rights, but its close alignment with China. Over the past week, the American media in particular has tried to pin the blame for the junta’s violence on the failure of Beijing to take sufficiently strong action. A Washington Post editorial on Thursday, for instance, was entitled “Save Burma: Will China and Russia give green light to a slaughter of monks?” It criticised the two powers for blocking a UN resolution condemning the violence in Burma.

No doubt, China and Russia are cynically supporting repressive regimes to advance their economic and strategic interests. But they are not alone. In the case of Burma, India quietly dropped its criticism of the junta and is seeking to extend its economic and diplomatic influence in the country. Burma’s largest trading partner is not China, but neighbouring Thailand, which is ruled by a military dictatorship with tacit US support. The Bush administration’s campaign on Burma is not motivated by concerns for ordinary Burmese, but is aimed at establishing a pro-US regime in Rangoon as part of its strategic encirclement of China.

Moreover, one can safely predict that the present media adulation for the protestors would rapidly change if the demonstrations and marches began to take a more radical direction. Unlike the protests of 1988, which involved significant sections of workers, the recent demonstrations have been, to date, largely dominated by monks and students. The entry of substantial sections of working people into political action would not only shake the junta, but would reverberate through the region and internationally.

Far from being endowed with great strength, the Burmese junta is acting from a position of weakness. Despised by the majority of the population, the generals are confronting a profound economic crisis. Despite the development of offshore gas fields, the economy is plagued by inflation, which is running at an estimated annual rate of 20 percent, and chronic shortages of investment and foreign exchange. Economic analysts generally treat the official claims of high growth rates with scepticism. In 2003, the regime declared a growth figure of 5.1 percent, even as it confronted a private banking crisis and banned the export of six major crops.
The gulf between the pampered lifestyle of the generals and the poverty confronting the majority of the population is staggering. More than 90 percent of the population live on less than 300,000 kyat (about $US300) a year. An estimated 43 percent of children under the age of five are malnourished. On average, nearly 70 percent of household income is spent of food—that is, surviving from one day to the next. Spending on health care and education amounts to just 1.4 percent of GDP—less than half that of Indonesia, the region’s next lowest spender.

The latest protests were triggered last month by the junta’s decision to slash price subsidies on petrol, diesel and gas, increasing transport costs and sending the price of basic items skyrocketting. Opposition leaders, however, have not sought to mobilise the social discontent of ordinary working people to bring down the junta, but rather deliberately limited the protest demands.

A statement released by the 88 Generation Students and the All Burma Monks Alliance last week listed just three demands: the release of political prisoners, economic well-being and national reconciliation. Like Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD, these groups are seeking to use the protests and international diplomacy to pressure the regime into dialogue and a compromise power-sharing arrangement. The NLD’s basic program, which consists of implementing IMF-dictated reforms to open Burma up to foreign investors, would be just as catastrophic for ordinary working people as the junta’s economic policies.

The conclusion that some of the veterans of the 1988 protests appear to have drawn is that their previous demands were too radical. In fact, the opposite is the case. In 1988, the junta was reeling under the impact of strikes in the oil industry, transport, postal services, telecommunications and factories, as well as widespread protests. It managed to cling to power by striking a deal with the NLD to end the protests in return for elections in 1990. Having stabilised their rule, the generals simply ignored the outcome of the poll, suppressed the opposition and continued in power.



Thursday, 27 September 2007

Burmese Military Cracks Down On Escalating Protests

The military in Burma (Myanmar) unleashed its troops yesterday on unarmed demonstrators in a bid to stamp out mounting protests against the junta’s stifling rule, and price rises that have made life for broad layers of working people unbearable.
A series of clashes took place in the former capital Rangoon (Yangon) as protestors, including many Buddhist monks, took to the streets in defiance of the military. On Tuesday, the junta imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew in Rangoon and Mandalay, the country’s second largest city, and banned assemblies of more than five people. Heavily-armed troops were stationed in key positions, including outside major monasteries that have become centres of protest.
The state media yesterday reported that at least one protestor was killed in clashes in Rangoon between demonstrators and security forces. An unnamed official told the AFP that three people were dead—one was killed after trying to seize a soldier’s rifle and two others were beaten to death. Other reports from individuals and opposition groups indicate that the toll could be higher. Another 300 people were reportedly arrested.
The clashes began outside the Shwedagon Pagoda but failed to deter an estimated 10,000 young monks and students from marching toward the Sule Pagoda in downtown Rangoon. Hundreds of troops fired warning shots and tear gas then broke up the protest using batons. Several hundred monks also tried to reach the house of detained opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, followed by trucks carrying troops. In Mandalay, an estimated 10,000 people took part in protests.
The protests have been building since the junta’s decision on August 15 to suddenly double the price of diesel and raise the price of natural gas by 500 percent. Within days, as transport prices jumped, the cost of essential items rose by between 10 and 50 percent. Eggs, cooking oil and poultry increased by an average of 35 percent. The regime, which has a monopoly on fuel sales, had previously subsidised prices.
Initially the marches, which were organised by students and began on August 19, were quite small. The protests, however, have continued to swell despite arrests and police violence. Over the weekend, tens of thousands took part in demonstrations in Rangoon. On Monday, protests took place in at least 25 cities including Mandalay, Stitwe and Pakokku. The march in Rangoon was estimated at between 50,000 and 100,000 people.
The demonstrations are by far the largest since 1988 when huge protests involving students, workers, monks, and the urban and rural poor challenged the military dictatorship, demanding democratic rights and improved living standards. The army responded by gunning down hundreds of protesters, jailing opposition leaders and suppressing any form of political opposition. An estimated 3,000 people were killed by the military and many more were detained and tortured.
Speaking over state radio on Monday night, the junta’s religious affairs minister, Brigadier General Thura Myint Maung, denounced the “destructive elements” behind the protests and warned “actions will be taken against the monks according to the law”. On Tuesday, police arrested U Win Naing, a senior leader of Suu Kyi’s National League of Democracy (NLD) and Zaganar, a popular comedian who is known for satirising the regime. Zaganar had appealed for people to join the protests. Yesterday the crackdown intensified.
The international media has highlighted the role of Buddhist monks in the current protests. Their prominence, however, is a function of the timidity and conservatism of Suu Kyi and other NLD leaders, who appear to have been caught off guard by the demonstrations. Far from seeking to challenge the junta, the NLD is seeking to limit the protests and exploit them as a bargaining chip to establish negotiations with the generals.
The British-based Times noted yesterday: “Opposition leaders in Rangoon are struggling to contain the energy of the demonstrations to prevent anything that could be used as a pretext for a crackdown by the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), as the junta calls itself. They fear a split between radicals, who want to bring down the regime, and moderates, who believe that the most important thing is to avoid frightening off ordinary Burmese and bring them out in an overwhelming display of moral authority.”
NLD leader Sann Aung told the Times: “There should be no agitation to topple the military regime. It will make people much more wary of a military response and people will become reluctant to join the movement.” The newspaper also pointed to the limited character of the demands made by senior monks: an apology for abuse by the regime, a reduction in fuel prices, the release of political prisoners and political dialogue with the junta.
These appeals for restraint are, however, opening the door for further military repression. By confining the anger of ordinary working people, the opposition leaders will only embolden the generals to go on the offensive against the protests. That is the central political lesson of the events of 1988, when Suu Kyi and the NLD struck a deal with the junta to hold elections and shut down the protest movement. The junta seized the deal with both hands, stabilised their rule and then ignored the outcome of the 1990 poll, in which the NLD won an overwhelming majority.
For nearly two decades, the NLD’s perspective has been confined to using the pressure of sanctions imposed by the major powers to reach a compromise with the junta. As for its professions of concern for the Burmese population, the NLD supports the IMF and World Bank’s free market policies of opening up the country to foreign investors. The social consequences are evident in the junta’s slashing of fuel subsidies last month, entirely in line with this agenda.
Even before the latest price rises, inflation was running at more than 30 percent and 90 percent of the population lived below the poverty line of $US1 a day. The 450,000-strong army accounts for 40 percent of the annual national budget. An unemployed economics graduate told the Sydney Morning Herald: “Many people can no longer afford to send their children to school. They’re down to one meal a day, it’s that bad. As a result many are malnourished and they’re falling ill. But then they can’t even find the money for medical bills. Sure, we had difficulties before, but the price rises broke the camel’s back. Living standards have gone down and down. The middle classes have become poor, and the poor have become destitute.”
International rivalries
The military crackdown has produced an outpouring of hypocrisy from world leaders, led by President Bush, and in the international media. Speaking at the UN General Assembly on Tuesday, Bush condemned the Burmese junta and announced the imposition of new sanctions against individual leaders. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown denounced the regime as “illegitimate and repressive” while French President Nicolas Sarkozy urged the EU to impose tougher penalties against the junta. An emergency meeting of the UN Security Council was convened behind closed doors yesterday to consider the situation.
None of this has anything to do with concern for the Burmese people and their rights. Elsewhere in South Asia, the Bush administration maintains the closest of relations with the Pakistani military dictator General Pervez Musharraf and keeps a diplomatic silence on India’s police-state measures in Kashmir, the repressive activities of the military-backed regime in Bangladesh and the autocratic methods of the Sri Lankan government as it wages a vicious communal civil war.
Washington’s objection to the Burmese junta is not its repressive methods, but its close alignment with China. Burma is strategically situated between China and India, next to South East Asia and close to key shipping lanes, in particular the Malacca Straits. The country also has significant natural resources, including an estimated 3 trillion cubic metres of natural gas and 3 billion barrels of crude oil.
For Beijing, Burma is an important strategic and economic partner. China provides weapons and diplomatic support to the military and is involved in developing the country’s infrastructure. In return, Beijing is seeking rights over the country’s oil and gas as well as strategic access to Burmese ports and military bases. During the first seven months of this year, China-Burmese trade reached $US1.1 billion, up 39.4 percent compared to the same period last year.
At the same time, there is growing rivalry for influence in Burma between China and India. High-level visits by Indian officials have been on the rise, two-way trade is increasing and India has provided loans and aid to the junta in a bid to win favour. In 2004, junta leader Than Shwe was given the red carpet treatment when he became the first Burmese head of state to visit India in 24 years. This year Indian oil company ONGC made a bid to buy Burmese gas, but lost out last month to Petro-China. Thailand is also investing in a huge $6 billion hydroelectricity project.
The steady stream of articles, particularly in the US, insinuating that China is to blame for the Burmese junta and demanding action from Beijing, is not matched by similar comments about India, an increasingly close US ally, or Thailand, another military dictatorship, which enjoys tacit US backing. The Bush administration’s calls for “democracy” in Burma are a pretext to press for the installation of a pro-US regime.
The US administration is no more concerned about democratic rights and the plight of the population in Burma, than it is in Iraq. As far as Washington is concerned, the ousting of the Burmese junta is an element of a broader US strategy of encircling China, which is emerging as a key strategic and economic competitor, as well as gaining access for American corporations to Burma’s natural resources and cheap labour.


By Sujeewa Amaranath

IFJ Protests as Journalists are Counted among Victims of Burma Violence

The International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) today called on the Burmese authorities to end the violent attacks on demonstrators and journalists covering the events there following the killing of one Japanese photographer and reports of another media death and intimidation of local and foreign media.

The IFJ condemnation follows the confirmation that Kenji Nagai was one of 8 people killed during demonstrations in the capital Rangoon. The IFJ is concerned for the safety of another journalist, a German photographer who is reportedly also a victim of a shooting by security forces.

“Once again we see that it is journalists who are in the front line facing violence from unrestrained security forces dealing with peaceful protest,” said AW. It is essential that the Burmese authorities lower the temperature and allow journalists and peaceful demonstrators to exercise their right to work safely and protest peacefully.

Japanese agency APF News has confirmed the death of Kenji Nagai, who was working for the agency. The Bangkok Post reported that a German photographer covering the demonstration was also killed by security forces.

According to the BBC, a hotel in which foreign journalists have been staying in Rangoon has been surrounded and ransacked.

The IFJ is also concerned by reports that the Burmese military junta ordered Rangoon-based journals and newspapers to publish a declaration denouncing the protests. According to the Burma Media Association, the Burmese junta's director of the Press Scrutiny and Registration Division, Major Tint Swe, instructed all Burmese print media at a meeting last Sunday to publish a declaration stating they were not interested in the ongoing protest.

Authorities have issued a night-time curfew and a ban on public gatherings of more than five people, measures which will be enforced for 60 days. The protest against the military junta is the biggest since the nation-wide pro-democracy uprising of 1988 led by students, which ended in bloodshed as the military killed many of the protesters.

Tuesday, 25 September 2007

Develop, Displace, Forget The Poor

"What else did you expect me to do?" was her reply when I asked her why she had pulled her son out of school to turn him into a child labourer. She is one of four lakh parents to have done so in Assam alone, all of them displaced in the name of national development and left to fend for themselves. Assam claims to have displaced 4,51,252 people from 3,91,773 acres between 1947 and 2000. The real figures stand at 19,09,368 people from 14,01,186 acres. West Bengal has done the same to 7 million people from 4.7 million acres in the same period. Similar numbers are found in other states .

Leave alone rehabilitation, most of them are not even seen as displaced. Assam has rehabilitated those displaced by just about 10 projects out of 3,000 and West Bengal has partially resettled around 10 percent of them. Fifty-six percent of the displaced in Assam and 49 percent in Bengal have turned their children into child labourers. When that is not possible, women sell their bodies to keep the hearth fires burning. Crime is another option.

Studies indicate that India has deprived some 60 million people of their livelihood in the name of national development. Fewer than 20 percent have been rehabilitated. Since colonial land laws continue and recognise only individual ownership, Assam has not counted the 1 million acres of common land from which it displaced 14.5 lakh tribals, Dalits and others. It has been their sustenance for centuries but the colonial laws declare it State property. The official claim that compensation is rehabilitation is untenable. But the ruling class does not have to worry about them because they are powerless. Tribals are more than 20 million of these 60 million, Dalits are 12 millions and other rural poor are some 10 million. They can be displaced and forgotten.

That is the future trend too. Nandigram and Singur hog headlines but not Navi Mumbai, other SEZs and the 2.26 lakh acres that West Bengal has committed to industries with private profit as the only criterion. One hundred and sixty eight massive dams are being planned in the Northeast. Former PM Vajpayee declared in May 2002 the dams will turn the Northeast into the powerhouse of India. Many more lakhs of people who will be impoverished by them were ignored.

Greater poverty is intrinsic to this Shining India approach. Crime for survival, prostitution and child labour are its result. Is this the only alternative or is development with a human face possible?

By WALTER FERNANDES
Fernandes is director, North Eastern Social Research Centre